Issues
A political program to help USA in Iraq
Al-Shikaki Ahmed
Henry Kissinger published on July 2, 2007 in the International Herald Tribune an article entitled “A political program to exit Iraq”. His purpose was to explain the importance of finding a political solution for Iraq before the American withdrawal, which must be gradual. He added that: “the Iraqi groups have been conducting blood feuds with one another for centuries. These struggles hinder the Iraqis to resolve their problems by constitutional means, so the Iraqis need the international support for carrying out their agreements or to contain the conflict if Iraq breaks up.”Mr. Kissinger was however in error when he referred to centuries of conflict between Iraqis. On the contrary, despite the diversity of the Iraqi population, people have lived together in harmony in this part of the world for centuries. Although the population was often difficult to subdue by central government, a real civil conflict, based on ethnic or sectarian animosities, was rare. Different Iraqi groups were participated in the 1920 revolt, all united by a desire to be free of British rule. A chief feature of the movement was the unprecedented cooperation between the Sunnis and the Shiites communities.
Most conflicts were between the central government, which indeed was frequently unrepresentative of the complexity of Iraqi society and other equally unrepresentative political or religious sub-groups, depending on the historical moment.
By the 1990s Iraq was not a “Sunni-dominated” state, it was a state ultimately ruled by and for Saddam’s family and his faithful and trusty subordinates whatever their ethnic or religious origins.
The brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime against the Shiites and the Kurds intensified the differences among the Iraqi people. The Anfal campaign of repression against the Kurds and gassing the Kurdish town of Halabja fostered feelings of unity and of shared destiny among the Kurds. The Kurds have nowadays a clear sense of nationhood and feel more than ever before alienated from the Iraqi state. Moreover Saddam Hussein’s bloody repression of the uprising in the south of Iraq at the end of the second Gulf War has further deepened the cleavage between Sunnis and Shiites.
The current U.S Administration is attempting to evade the responsibility for creating civil-war conditions in Iraq. The invasion of Iraq had created a power vacuum in the country, which led to the spread of instability and chaos. The most important error committed by the occupation forces was their inability to secure the country and impose order after the invasion which in turn has given rise to independent militias that are increasingly organized along sectarian lines.
The second mistake was the dissolution of the Iraqi army and all pre-existing security forces. The Iraqi army was the only institution, which could maintain the Iraqi national unity and territorial integrity because it was not built on a sectarian or ethnic basis; on the contrary, it was composed of every ethnic, religious and sectarian element in Iraqi society.
The third source of escalating sectarian differences in Iraq was the creation of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) on ethnic and religious lines. The (IGC) was supposed to reflect the major ethnic and religious components of Iraqi society in order to become the crucible from which a new Iraqi political life might spring. Instead, even in the process of writing the new Iraqi constitution the drafters fragmented disastrously along ethnic, religious and communal lines. As a result, the new constitution exacerbated the contest between different groups and communities over very important issues.
Undoubtedly Iraq needs the assistance of the whole International Community to restructure itself because the American Administration has failed completely in reconstructing Iraq since its invasion in April 2003. But it is important to note that the unilateral way in which the Bush Administration went into the war, left it mostly bereft of international partners. Now, after four years of malfunction the U.S is trying to get regional and international support to help Iraq and at the same time to assist the U.S to get out from the Iraqi swamp. The rest of the world is not rushing to help. However, failure in resolving or containing the Iraqi crisis in the future will impact not just the US alone, but on the whole International Community.
The U.S faces now a dilemma in Iraq and in the Middle East. On one hand, it will presumably try to satisfy at least some U.S strategic aims and goals. On the other hand, the U.S has stated that it intends to create a more democratic government and more freedom for Iraqi citizens and then apply this model to the whole Middle East. What if these two goals conflict? Greater freedom may result in a leadership anxious for an end to occupation in Iraq and committed to goals at odds with U.S interests. Moreover, some regional powers will not be happy with a democratic, free and strong Iraq and they will try to destabilize and abort any attempt at democracy in Iraq, although they would not like the Iraqi crisis to spread to them.What U.S should do?
Any unplanned American withdrawal could provoke a civil war and regional disaster. Meanwhile wielding the promise of withdrawal could give the U.S valuable leverage, convincing Iraqis, Iraq’s neighbors, and much of the international community to look beyond their desire to see the U.S. chastened and toward their shared interest in Iraq’s long- term stability. Thus U.S. can modulate two simultaneous messages: a clear desire to leave Iraq and equally clear willingness to stay until the Iraqi government, with the support of its neighbors and the international community, proves capable of securing its territory and protecting its citizens.Iraq lacks a political culture of moderation and compromise that many see as a necessary condition for a power-sharing arrangement to work in a sustainable way. If power relations between the groups change, leaders may not be prepared to re-negotiate or compromise and the shaky ethnic and religious institutional structure will break apart.
The U.S. must make it clear to the Iraqi community leaders that it is their responsibility to reach compromise with responsible leaders of other ethnic or sectarian communities because the U.S. cannot remain in Iraq indefinitely, nor can it adjudicates Iraqi factional disputes. American pressure may be needed to bring the parties together if they cannot agree on how to divide the cake and, if necessary, to enforce a compromise and raise the costs of defection.
The reconstruction of Iraq needs a huge amount of international political, economic and military assistance for several years. In the short term, the more control over the political and economic transformation process handed over to international organizations and institutions, the better will be for the future of democracy in Iraq. In the long run, it will be for the Iraqis themselves to determine the future of their country.
Al-Shikaki Ahmed
Political Researcher in CERMAM
Master in Political Sciences
DEA in Development StudiesPermanent link to this entry (permalink)
- Origin CERMAM
- http://www.cermam.org/en/logs/dossier/a_political_program_to_help_us_1/
- Publié le 24 July 2007
