Issues
Consequences of the war in the Lebanon on a regional and international level
Marwa Daoudy and Salam Kawakibi. About the Lebanese Crisis.
Marwa Daoudy is a Doctor in Political Science and a researcher affiliated to the International Studies and Research Centre (Political Science, CNRS). She teaches International Relations at the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva).
Salam Kawakibi is a researcher in the fields of Political Science and International Relations. He used to be responsible for the French Near-East Institute in Alep (Syria).
After a month of war and a fragile truce, what are the conditions required for actual civil peace?
Marwa Dawdy : The war will have cost 1,200 civilian lives, mostly children's, and wounded more than 4,000. Because of it, direct and indirect loss of 15 billion dollars will have been incurred, together with the destruction of 130,000 houses, 145 bridges, almost 630 km of road and 900 factories. Now, a huge amount of landmines, traps and cluster bombs are scattered around the south of the country. During the war, all the communities – whether rivals or allies – united to form a sacred union which stood behind the Hezbollah, who was seen incarnating Lebanese resistance. The fragile equilibrium that the Lebanese political and civil society had managed to attain has since then been undermined by the indefectible support the Americans have been giving to Israel's brutal action, thereby making the allies of the Seniora government seem less valuable.
These actions have now come under criticism from the 8th March opposition, as well as from the 14th March majority. Reconstruction after the war will be a difficult phase. For the various political and community Lebanese movements, defining how to make Hezbollah and its armed branch a full part of the Lebanese political system will be at stake. Furthermore, reflection is needed on how to build a political and civil society within a stable state. Internal dilemmas and regional stakes cannot be treated separately.
Salam Kawakibi : Civil peace in the Lebanon has been achieved on an institutional level despite internal and external attempts to weaken it. Since the 1989 Taef accords, the Lebanese parties have succeeded in establishing a platform for peace. Nevertheless, the pact has considerable lacunae. The fact that the Taef accords have not been wholly applied, added to the ill-will of some of the participants in the Lebanese political scene and some regional political scenes, means that disputes should no longer be a great threat to the so-called «civil peace».
After the Syrian army pulled out, national dialogue became more open, and it will be continued in a new way and in new circumstances. Before the war with Israel started, some of the parties thought their objectives would be achieved quickly but they now realise that they were wrong to assume so. The ongoing debate might lead them in a different direction. The givens as well as people's opinions have considerably changed. Subsequent to this war, an important political pole was strengthened; it united the Shia forces with a current that is strongly supported by the Maronites, that of General Michel Aoun's. For there to be a real «reconstitution» of Lebanese politics, one basic condition has to be fulfilled: the establishment of a national policy where each party is independent of regional and international influence. However, such a step, appears almost Utopian, and will take a long time to achieve.
When the war is over, will Hezbollah be able to make a complete political turnabout?
M. D. : Hezbollah was created after the Lebanon was invaded by Israel in 1982. Since the Israelis withdrew in 2000 (it is believed in the Lebanon that Hezbollah was responsible for this feat) the party has partly become the emblem of the broadly disadvantaged Shia population living in the south of the country. In 2005, it entered the Lebanese institutional system, benefiting from the support of an important Christian ally, Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. With the 2006 war, the party reacquired the status of the sole political and military organisation capable of defending the country, which led some Lebanese to admire it, and others to feel exasperated. The need to reinforce the Lebanese army was felt before the war, and this is felt even more so now, after the conflict. There could be some negotiations regarding prisoner exchanges between Israel and the Lebanon, and these talks could be the springboard for both the resumption of national dialogue and for future talks as regards disarming Hezbollah and its eventual integration into the regulary army. In order to overcome any reticence regarding this topic it would be better for the negotiations to take place as the result of a regional and bilateral impulsion, especially those regarding the Shebaa farms and their occupation by Israel as well as their restitution to the Lebanon.
S. K. : This «turnabout» has been on the way since May 2000 when the Israeli army vacated South Lebanon after facing Lebanese national resistance for a long period of time and seen the resistance fall under the influence of Hezbollah. As I have mentioned in an article published in the Lebanon last winter, it is possible that while this party is busy with politics, some «non-religious» Arab regimes are active in the religious field. What I mean is that religion itself no longer is the main axis of the political action of Hezbollah. Militarism also used to be a secondary preoccupation. With its deputies in Parliament and two Ministers, and with its social and associative fieldwork, Hezbollah enjoys latitude in its actions and occupies an important part of the Lebanese political scene. The other components of the Lebanese political and religious scene are reassured by Hezbollah's leaders' confirmation that they do not now, after the latest war, and did not either before it, call for the creation of a religious state. In my opinion, the biggest question is whether the other actors on the political scene are willing to accept this party into the political family. Accepting it would strengthen its tendency to stay out of the way of any kind of external influence or grip.
What will the consequences of the war in the Lebanon be for the situation in Palestine and in Israel?
M. D. : Even if many people in Israel want to keep these matters separate, they are linked. This is the heart of the Israelo-Arab conflict. Let us not forget that close to 400,000 Palestinian refugees live on the Lebanese territory, in conditions that are often very difficult. Hezbollah justified the capture of the two Israeli soldiers by basing it on a request to exchange 10,000 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners imprisoned in Israel. Hassan Nasrallah's idea to launch a surprise attack was certainly influenced by the continual bombing of Gaza by Israel, that had started at the beginning of the year. His idea that pressure on two fronts would lead the Israeli government to do more than its unilateral strategy suggests and not simply to continue the military actions that had been undertaken by Ariel Sharon when he was in power and later by Ehud Olmert. In Israel, there is a debate regarding the hasty and impulsive decision of the Olmert government to launch a war on such a scale, with no actual military preparation or clear objectives, and at the same time underestimating the adversary. In the next months, it is likely that we will see the fall of the present coalition's cabinet and the come back Netanyahu's hard right.
S. K.: The population of the occupied Territories was given some sort of hope with this event. However, the only consequences of the war for them will be psychological, since the situation in the Territories is different. Thus, despite the regional dimension of its mediatised action, Hezbollah will be satisfied with its national «victory» on the Lebanese political scene, and it will not seek to take its experiment further in other countries like Palestine, bar on a theoretical level.
In what respect has Hezbollah reinforced the axis between Syria and Iran?
M. D. : Despite considerable human and material costs, the strategic victory has been won by Hezbollah, and more directly by its chief, Sheikh Nasrallah. The policy of the Bush Administration in Iraq, relayed by Israeli incursions into the Palestinian territories, has doubtlessly led to a reinforcement of the circumstantial alliance uniting the Shiite Hezbollah with the Sunnite Hamas, as well as with Syria, a non-religious country, and with Iran, a regional power whose influence inside Iraq leaves no room for doubt. It would be simplistic to think that Hezbollah is a mere puppet of Syria and Iran, taking care of their interests in the Lebanon. On the other hand, it is obvious that the party will not have acted without consulting its regional allies. By fixing the return of the Golan, occupied and annexed by Israel, as the price for peace, Syria is reinforcing its own position by associating itself with Hezbollah and its undeniable power. The power of Hezbollah has obliged Israel to stall its plans to attacks Iran's nuclear power stations. Syria and Iran will have taken considerable risks, but the strategic advantages they have gained made them worthwhile. On the eve of the publication of Brammertz's final Report, Kofi Annan's visit to Syria acknowledged the fact that this country is now a partner who cannot be ignored in the resolution of the conflict. The same goes for Iran, currently in an arm wrestling against the United States regarding nuclear power.
S. K. : First of all, «victory» is a word that needs to be used cautiously when addressing Hezbollah's actions. It did indeed succeed on a military level against one of the best armies in the world. One must not forget that the Israeli war's main impact was firstly on civilians and it is also true that the population targeted by the attacks, as well as the Lebanese fighters, put up a massive resistance, as. However there were colossal losses both on an infrastructure level and on a human one. It is possible that this «victory» tightened the knots that have long united Iran and Syria. On the other hand, it could paradoxically harm the «axis» that other countries fear. Interests are what guide a policy. In this sense, the axis would be weakened or change its nature if Iran were to solve its problems with the West regarding nuclear power, or if Syria received political or economic offers from the «others». This leads to this early conclusion: Hezbollah needs to handle the next episode better in order to try and distance itself from the axis without making its political relations with Iran and Syria suffer. It needs to be considered as a fully-fledged Lebanese political formation.
Do you think that the outcome of the Lebanon war indicates a shift in the balance of power on the regional and international scenes?
M. D. : The shift is not structural. Israel still possesses the most powerful army of the region (the fourth most powerful in the world), even if the Israeli general staff is now questioning its military strategy. Power remains a matter of perception and of latitude, and today Israel is facing an unpredictable neighbour, that it failed to destroy and it will need to take this into account in future decisions. Two scenarios could result from this: either the Israelis will harden their standpoint, perhaps with a new government that will wish to rekindle the conflict to annihilate Hezbollah once and for all, or Israel will start a new strategic relationship with its neighbours, which would produce an impulsion for negotiations set on new bases. This war will have shown the United States that Iran is determined to stay a major regional player and that it has a very strong will, and that Syria is determined to withstand the American project of a «new Middle-East».
S. K. : There has already been a great change on the military level. From a political point of view, the regional forces that backed Hezbollah feel victorious. They were neither right nor wrong. They can achieve success if they manage to exploit this fact. The forthcoming period of time will be made of uncertainties and overstatements, and many things might happen. The political game will determine who are the winners in the next months. Israelis will discuss their «defeat» with their regional and international allies. The Arab powers will ask their Occidental supporters for help to study this «victory» and make sure it doesn't backfire on them in an unexpected fashion. The Americans, losing face in Iraq, now face rising «hatred» among the Arab populations. As always, Europeans are undecided and try to show an independent policy line, but first of all they need to show what line they are going to follow and convince people that they actually do have one. Russia has been a keen observer and has an opaque standpoint which will possibly help it re-enter the region. The Israeli war and the Lebanese resistance will make many people think in the near future.
Translated into English by Marguerite Cornu, Research Assistant trainee
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- Origin CERMAM
- http://www.cermam.org/en/logs/dossier/consequences_of_the_war_in_the/
- Publié le 16 November 2006