Points of View
European and American reaction to « Nag Hammadi » attacks in Egypt: Which result?
On January 6, Coptic Christmas Eve, three assailants opened fire on worshipers as they leave the midnight mass, in "Nag Hamadi, some 700 km south of Cairo. Seven people were killed: six Copts and one Muslim policeman. These attacks that mark a real warning signal have generated considerable discussion in Europe as well as the United States. In this article, we attempt to analyze these reactions, and the meanings they give and the results they generate.
![Egyptians[1].jpg](http://www.cermam.org/en/logs/Egyptians%5B1%5D.jpg)
The delegation of religious freedoms one of the agencies under the U. S Ministry of External Affairs preparing that has to publish its annual report on the status of religious freedom in the world next April, has established a visit to Cairo two weeks after the "Nag Hammadi" attacks. The goal of this visit was the revision of the current state of freedoms in Egypt. If the visit was already planned for two months before, these latest attacks led the delegation to explore the possibility of converting the status of Egypt from the list of "important to monitor" that relates to countries that need a supervision as regards the issues of freedoms to the status of "special state" that relates to the states where the situation of minorities requires a special monitoring, which certainly means a call for greater monitoring of the human rights issues by the United State, as it is deteriorating in the delegation eyes. The delegation also expressed to the National Council of Human Rights in Egypt the discontent of the Coptic "lobby" in the United States vis-à-vis of the degrading situation of Copts in Egypt. In the same context, Tamara Coffman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East has made several meetings with leaders and activists of human rights in Egypt, discussing also « Nag Hamadi » attacks.
The European Parliament for his part, has insisted in his meeting in Starsbourg to release a statement showing its concern vis-à-vis these attacks, a statement far more ease than the "first draft" in which attacks were strongly condemned and the Egyptian government was singled out, recalling that he had to respect democratic principles and the freedom of dogma, as the Euro-Mediterranean parternships points. Certainly, the difference between " the 1st draft" and the final one is due to the efforts of the Egyptian diplomacy which was trying of course to embellish the external image of the egyptian regime.
But is that these various statements can be considered as a sort of pressure in the Egyptian regime?
The answer is certainly not.
The reason is the prevalence of strategic interests on those that we might call as "normative". Thus, if the Bush regime has made from the promotion of democracy and human rights after September 11 a special policy, the new President of the United States for its part, regarded the issue as a matter of internal policy, certainly encouraged by the United States, but that should in no way be the subject of external intervention. The Barack Obama speech at Cairo University, June 4 last, freeing the U.S. policy of democratization from its ideological complexion, confirms this new approach. Thus, the new U.S. administration more realistic and realizing that its strategic interests prevailed most, has abandoned a policy of promoting democracy that contradict its interests. Hence, the delegation's report even if highly critical, it would not change a Strategic Partnership that is especially strengthening after the abandonment of the old U.S. policy called "democracy promotion".
If Egypt’s Strategic Partnership with the United States serves him as leverage, its strategic importance is also very useful as regards to its relations with the European Union. Moreover, the Egyptian reaction relatively indifferent to this statement compared to the very disproportionate one (where the Egyptian Minister of External Affairs has removed the 27 Egyptian ambassadors of European countries) against the declaration of the European Parliament criticizing the human rights situation, two years ago, are just two sides of the same coin. If this over reaction was used as a threat to countries that rely on its regional weight, indifference to this current statement reflects the same confidence. The Egyptian regime knows very well that the EU is unable to exert real pressure on it as the latter wishes to preserve its strategic interests in Egypt. The refusal to ratify the Cairo Action Plan on the European Neighborhood Policy in 2007, as an obligation to address the issue of human rights with the EU was included, despite the potential benefits that such ratification can bring Cairo, confirms this excess of confidence. Thus, the Egyptian government has put the EU face to a zero sum game: Either the Europeans insist to ratify an action plan more or less strict in terms of political reform and human rights at risk of failure of negotiations already very long and very difficult with a country of such strategic importance, either to accept to ratify the action plan as it stands at the risk of diminishing their credibility as proponents of human rights. The EU has probably chosen the second option because, for its part, losing its credibility on human rights is preferable to the lose all credibility regarding to its new neighborhood policy, which may happen if Egypt does not belong.
It remains to say that if the U.S. or European pressures wich are very dull, succeeded any how, they can only force the Egyptian regime to implement cosmetic measures regarding human rights protections, as its very well known policy: "changing all in order to change nothing", will only follow!
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- Origin CERMAM
- http://www.cermam.org/en/logs/vue/european_and_american_reaction/
- Publié le 1 February 2010
