Close Up
The Italy-Libya Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation
Interview with Natalino Ronzitti
Professor, International Law (LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome); Scientific Advisor, IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome)
On 2nd March, 2009 the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya initially signed by PM Berlusconi and Col. Gheddafi on August 30th, 2008 was finally enforced. In June, the Libyan leader was invited for his first official state visit to Italy.
1. The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation is supposed to usher in a new era in bilateral relations. How significant is it for Italy and Libya respectively?
A. The Treaty paves the way for increasing and strengthening co-operation between the two countries, which never ended even at the height of major political tensions or during the period in which Libya was subjected to UN sanctions due to suspicions that it was supporting international terrorism. The Treaty should boost economic and trade relations between the two nations.
2. What are the strongest/weakest elements in the Treaty?
A. Chapter III, devoted to the new bilateral partnership, is the most promising part of the Treaty. It furthers co-operation in several fields, mainly energy, economy and industry. It also includes cultural co-operation. Article 19 of the Treaty is of outmost importance, since it figures out collaboration in the fight against terrorism, organized crime and illegal immigration. The first Chapter of the Treaty embodies lofty principles which are mainly a restatement of those included in the United Nations Charter. The major problem is here represented by the principle of ‘non-interference’ in domestic affairs and the use made of US bases in Italy. Since the Treaty forbids any use of territory for hostile purposes, how far could the transit of US warships leaving from Italian ports and sailing through the Gulf of Sidra be considered a hostile use of the Italian territory? Libya claims historic jurisdiction over the Gulf of Sidra; claim which is not recognized by the US and other Western countries, Italy included. Chapter II is devoted to the final settlement of colonial claims and to financial compensation. Italy promised Libya 5 billion US dollars over a period of 20 years. It is a huge amount of money, that should be employed for infrastructural projects yet to be identified. Since all the works will be assigned to Italian companies, it is a kind of aid to Italian corporations. However, 20 years is a long time and every single project will have to be identified by a Mixed Commission. A point of contention might be represented by the debt incurred by Libya, which still has to pay Italian companies for works completed over the past years. The amount of such debt has not been specified in the Treaty, and a final settlement is supposed to be reached by means of an exchange of letters. A time frame has also not been fixed.
3. Both the Treaty and col. Gheddafi’s recent visit to Italy triggered wide economic
expectations; what are, on the other hand, their political relevance?
A. Collaboration with ENI dates back to Libyan independence and was not discontinued when Gheddafi took power. Libya invested in Fiat in the ‘70s and such policy has continued with a renovated interest for Fiat and also for the Italian banking system, e.g. Unicredit. The Libyan sovereign fund is prepared to increase its investments. If all the expectations are to be met, the Treaty will constitute an example of how relations between a wealthy, former colony and its European mother State can develop. The settlement of all colonial claims and the formal apologies which Italy extended to Libya might constitute an example for other European powers. I however doubt that France or UK are ready to follow the Italian lead. In spite of Gheddafi’s declared intention to privilege Italian companies, Libya’s real expectation is that American companies will flock back, attracted by the promise of State companies’ privatization.
4. The Italian government’s decision to return to Libya boatloads of immigrants caught in international waters in May (2009) attracted widespread criticism from international human rights organisations. What does the Treaty say on this matter, and in what relation is it with previous bilateral agreements and current EU policies?
A. As previously mentioned, the Treaty includes a specific provision on the fight against illegal immigration. Libya enters the obligation to stop illegal immigration at its territorial borders by means of an electronic detection system and of other technologies to be provided by Italy. 50% of the costs will be covered by Italy; the other half should be covered by funds that the two Mediterranean countries will request from the European Union. It is therefore important for the EU to be involved in the process of containment of illegal immigration, and also to favour the economic conditions apt at preventing this phenomenon. This last objective should however be part of a long-term policy, while the containment of illegal immigration needs to be addressed immediately. It should not, however, be carried out at the expenses of a genuine asylum policy. For instance, the EU should insist for the ratification on the part of Libya of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, even though a refugee policy is envisaged within the African Union. The other obligation entered into by Libya relates to its maritime borders, since the Sidra coastline is where the immigrants’ flow through the Mediterranean originates. The Treaty envisages the implementation of the Agreement entered into in 2000 as well the implementation of two Protocols concluded in 2007, and which provide for patrols of the Libyan coast by boats supplied by Italy. It should also be remembered that Italy and Libya are both parties to the UN Protocol on the fight against organized crime and illegal immigration by land, sea and air, which was also signed in 2000.
5. The Treaty envisages defence and military cooperation: how significant is this, and in what way can Libya’s role be deemed crucial in promoting ‘peace, stability and security’ in the Mediterranean?
A. Defence and military cooperation between the two countries has already been set in motion. Libya is interested in buying helicopters and in modernizing its air fleet which was made completely obsolete by the long embargo. Italian company Finmeccanica won the order to build a number of helicopters. Cooperation should be increased with the acquisition by Libya of a number of Finmeccanica shares. This is a very delicate problem since the company enjoys solid ties with the United States in the realm of defence and it should therefore be seen whether the Americans will approve a cooperation which might disclose sensitive equipment and technology. As for the Libyan role in promoting peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean, a first step was when Libya renounced WMD, to continue with normalization of its relations with the United States and the final settlement of the Lockerbie affair, and the promise not to directly or indirectly support terrorism, as set out in a letter addressed to the UN Security Council in 2003. Libya is part of the ‘5+5’ consultation group which includes France, Italy, Malta Portugal and Spain on the Northern side, and Algeria, Libya Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia on the Southern side. The Group may be strengthened through concrete initiatives, for instance in connection with soft security, regulation of fisheries and the delimitation of sea areas. Libya’s claim over the waters of the Gulf of Sidra, opposed to by the European Union, remains a source of contention.
6. How far will Libya’s progressive economic liberalisation and diplomatic thaw likely influence the country’s political establishment?
A. The main problem with future relations with Libya resides in its political system. The Rais is surrounded by able economic relations’ advisers. A major role has been played by the Libyan Ambassador to Italy. However, the future of a wealthy yet scarcely populated country cannot be entrusted to a few personalities, however capable they are. It is not clear whether Tripoli has become an arena for political reforms. Gheddafi’s views on democracy and on popular representation which were highlighted during his visit to Italy do not seem to head in that direction. Gheddafi is considered a bastion against Muslim radicalism and al Qaida, but this is not enough for the West to consider Libya a stable and trustworthy country.
7. In your opinion, how did the Italian government handle col. Gheddafi’s first official visit to Italy?
A. The visit to Italy did not go as smoothly as the Italian government expected. This was due to the erratic behaviour of the Colonel, who often disregarded protocol and released embarrassing statements, for instance when he drew a comparison between the US attack on Tripoli in 1986 and the one on the Twin Towers in 2001. A comparison which provoked only a weak reaction on the part of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who specified that the Italian Government does not necessarily have to agree with the Colonel’s strong words. Business is business! Gheddafi is notoriously an unpredictable leader not always in keeping with the diplomatic protocol. In another occasion, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Gianfranco Fini was forced to cancel a meeting after a two-hours wait, when the Colonel did not show up. Given the character of the personage, one might say that the Italian government dealt successfully with Gheddafi’s first visit to Italy.
This interview was realised by Chiara Sulmoni
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- Origin CERMAM
- http://www.cermam.org/en/logs/zoom/the_italylibya_treaty_on_frien_1/
- Publié le 20 July 2009